Neuronauki i ontologia prawa by Brożek, Bartosz
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Pol Law Rev, 2017 Vol. 3 (1), p. 110-125 DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0010.7842
110
 
Neuroscience and the 
Ontology of Law
Neuronauki i ontologia prawa
Article history: Received: 09.09.2017 Accepted: 15.11.2017 Published: 30.12.2017
Bartosz Brożek
Faculty of Law and Administration, 
Jagiellonian University and Coper-
nicus Center for Interdisciplinary 
Studies, Kraków. 
Abstract:
The goal of the paper is to consider the possible impact of the discoveries in 
cognitive neuroscience on legal ontology. First, it is argued that - contrary to 
some popular claims - social ontology is not a priori in relation to neuroscience. 
Second, the question of how culture in general, and law in particular, is pos-
sible, is answered from the perspective of the cognitive sciences. The answer 
is based on an evolutionary scenario, which explains the emergence of stable 
patterns of behaviour within human communities. Finally, the problem of the 
‘nature of law’ is addressed. It is argued that the picture of the evolution of 
culture sketched by the cognitive sciences provides an explanation why there 
exists no single, proper definition of law. 
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Streszczenie:
Celem artykułu jest rozważenie możliwego wpływu odkryć w dziedzinie neuro-
nauki poznawczej na ontologię prawa. Najpierw - wbrew popularnym tezom 
- dowodzi się, że tzw. ontologie społeczne nie są a priori wobec siatki pojęcio-
wej neuronauki. Po drugie, analizowany jest problem, jak - z perspektywy nauk 
kognitywnych – możliwa jest kultura, w tym prawo. Wyjaśnienie tego problemu 
opiera się na konstrukcji scenariusza ewolucyjnego, ukazującego drogę powsta-
nia stabilnych wzorców zachowań w społecznościach ludzkich. Po trzecie, ana-
lizie poddane zostaje pytanie o istnienie ‘natury prawa’. Twierdzi się, że obraz 
ewolucji kulturowej stworzony w naukach kognitywnych dostarcza przekonują-
cych argumentów, dlaczego nie istnieje jedna, poprawna definicja prawa. 
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The recent advancements in cognitive science 
have to a large extent reshaped our under-
standing of human behaviour. It is therefore 
no surprise that lawyers have been looking 
at the findings of neuroscience[1] and related 
disciplines in order to determine whether the 
new science of the mind[2] can contribute to the 
functioning of the law.[3] This process culminat-
ed in the establishment of a new legal disci-
pline, often referred to as ‘neurolaw’ or ‘law & 
neuroscience’.[4] So far, the interests of ‘neu-
rolawyers’ have been practical rather than the-
oretical or philosophical. According to a recent 
survey article, the main areas of ‘law & neu-
roscience’ include such legally relevant issues 
as brain death, brain injury, pain and distress, 
memory, emotions, lie detection, judging, brain 
development, and addictions.[5] These prob-
1The term ‘neuroscience’ is understood very broadly here and 
refers to all kinds of interdisciplinary study of the nervous sys-
tem, embracing various aspects thereof, from molecular to be-
havioural, and including, inter alia, behavioural neuroscience, 
cellular neuroscience, clinical neuroscience, cognitive neurosci-
ence, computational neuroscience, cultural neuroscience, devel-
opmental neuroscience, molecular neuroscience, neuroimaging, 
neuroengineering, neuroinformatics, neurolinguistics, social neu-
roscience and systems neuroscience.
2I borrow this phrase from an engaging book by Rowlands, M. 
(2010) The New Science of the Mind, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
3ed. Garland, B. (2004). Neuroscience and the Law, Dana Press, 
New York – Washington. For a critical overview see Pardo, M., 
Patterson, D. (2013) Minds, Brain, and Law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford.
4ed. Spranger, T. M. (2012). International Neurolaw, Springer, 
Dordrecht.
5Jones, O. D., Schall, J. D., Shen, F. X. (2014) Law and Neuro-
science, Vanderbilt University Law School, Public Law and Legal 
lems are not merely interesting from the legal 
point of view: any reasonable approach to the 
law requires to have an up-to-date and scien-
tifically sound understanding of the aforemen-
tioned issues. However, there are also studies 
which suggest that neuroscience (and cogni-
tive science in general) may contribute to the 
development of doctrinal theories pertaining to 
criminal responsibility or contract law.[6] Doubt-
less, such an approach is much more complex 
and connected to numerous methodological 
traps. The law operates within a certain con-
ceptual scheme which is quite different from 
the conceptual apparatus of neuroscience.[7] 
The legal ontology is still further up on the scale 
of abstractness, and hence the question arises 
whether the neuroscientific findings can in any 
conceivable way inform ontological inquiry. My 
goal in this paper is to consider this issue. I 
begin by rebutting an argument by Maxwell 
Bennett and Peter Hacker to the effect that our 
conceptual scheme – and hence our basic on-
tology – is a priori in relation to any scientific 
theory. Then I sketch a picture of the emer-
gence of culture as found in the recent evolu-
tionary scenarios and neuroscientific theories. 
Against this background I argue that there is 
no – and there cannot be – one correct under-
standing of what the law is, which explains why 
Theory, Working Paper p. 14–12. 
6Pardo, M., Patterson, D. op. cit. 
7Ibidem.
Słowa kluczowe: 
prawo, neuronauka, ontologia prawa, imitacja, natura prawa, postępowanie 
zgodnie z regułą
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it is possible to develop competing, but equally 
acceptable legal ontologies.
Legal ontology meets 
neuroscience
When one considers the relationship between 
neuroscience and ontology, the first problem 
to address is whether the findings of neuro-
science or other related disciplines have any 
relevance for ontological inquiry. Perhaps the 
most famous answer to this question was 
given by Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker 
in their celebrated book Philosophical Foun-
dation of Neuroscience.[8] Bennett and Hacker 
insist, first, that one should clearly distinguish 
between two types of questions, conceptual 
and empirical:
Distinguishing conceptual questions from em-
pirical ones is of the first importance. (…) Con-
ceptual questions antecede matters of truth 
and falsehood. They are questions concern-
ing our forms of representation, not questions 
concerning the truth or falsehood of empirical 
statements. These forms are presupposed by 
true (and false) scientific statements and by 
correct (and incorrect) scientific theories. They 
determine not what is empirically true or false, 
but rather what does and what does not make 
sense. Hence conceptual questions are not 
amenable to scientific investigation and ex-
perimentation or to scientific theorizing. For 
the concepts and conceptual relationships in 
question are presupposed by any such investi-
8Bennett, M.R., Hacker, P.M.S. (2003) Philosophical Foundations 
of Neuroscience, Wiley, Blackwell, Malden, Oxford. This section 
is partly based on my previous paper, Brożek, B. (2013) Philoso-
phy and Neuroscience. Three Modes of Interaction, in: Stelmach, 
J., Brożek, B. , Kurek, Ł. (eds.), Philosophy in Neuroscience, Co-
pernicus Center Press, Kraków.  
gations and theorizing.[9]
The final sentence of the quoted passage is of 
special interest. Bennett and Hacker claim that 
concepts are a priori to any scientific investi-
gation. They believe further that the failure to 
notice this fact often leads to serious errors, 
and in particular the so-called mereological 
fallacy, common – as they stress – in the con-
temporary cognitive neuroscience. It consists 
in referring to the brain or its parts with con-
cepts which are correctly applicable only to a 
person as a whole. They observe: [talking] of 
the brain’s perceiving, thinking, guessing or 
believing, or of one hemisphere of the brain’s 
knowing things of which the other hemisphere 
is ignorant, is widespread among contempo-
rary neuroscientists. This is sometimes de-
fended as being no more than a trivial façon 
de parler. But that is quite mistaken. For the 
characteristic form of explanation in contem-
porary cognitive neuroscience consists in as-
cribing psychological attributes to the brain 
and its parts in order to explain the possession 
of psychological attributes and the exercise 
(and deficiencies in the exercise) of cognitive 
powers by human beings.[10] 
One may ask whether the problem Bennett and 
Hacker identify is a real one. It may be argued, 
for example, that such claims as ‘the brain 
thinks’ or ‘the right hemisphere is responsible 
for decision-making’ are not to be taken liter-
ally. Some fundamental linguistic intuitions and 
the basic knowledge of language are enough 
to realize that such a utilization of the words 
‘think’ or ‘decide’ is metaphorical or analogi-
9Bennett, M., Dennett, D., Hacker, P., Searle, J. (2007) Neurosci-
ence and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language, Columbia Uni-
versity Press, New York, p. 4.
10Ibidem, p. 7.
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cal. Bennett and Hacker are fully aware of this 
strategy to defend the existing neuroscientific 
idiom and clarify that the evidence for neuro-
scientists’ committing the mereological fallacy 
does not lie in the fact that on occasions they 
use ‘inadequate’ psychological terms to de-
scribe the functioning of the brain, which may 
easily count as taking advantage of analogy, 
metaphor, homonym or using a concept with 
a derivative meaning. The mereological fallacy 
results when neuroscientists transfer entire 
complexes of concepts from the ‘psychologi-
cal discourse’ to the ‘neuroscientific’ one, and 
– on the basis of such inadequate attributions 
– they draw conclusions.
Is Bennett and Hacker’s argument tenable? I 
believe no, and the reason is their foundational 
view of knowledge. There are two interpreta-
tions of Bennett and Hacker’s foundational-
ism. The stronger interpretation, attributed to 
them by John Searle, is that they believe natu-
ral language to determine the only acceptable 
ontology. Searle says that they commit a fal-
lacy: the fallacy, in short, is one of confusing 
the rules for using the words with the ontology. 
Just as old-time behaviourism confused the 
evidence for mental states with the ontology 
of the mental states, so this Wittgensteinian 
criterial behaviourism construes the grounds 
for making the attribution with the fact that is 
attributed. It is a fallacy to say that the condi-
tions for the successful operation of the lan-
guage game are conditions for the existence 
of the phenomena in question.[11] 
This reading finds some textual evidence. In-
terestingly, while elaborating the doctrine of 
the mereological fallacy, Bennett and Hacker 
quote Aristotle as one of those who first con-
11Ibidem, p. 105.
demned this erroneous mode of thinking. He 
observed that ‘to say that the soul is angry 
is as if one remarked that the soul weaves 
or builds, for it is surely better not to say that 
the soul pities, learns or thinks, but that a 
man does these with his soul’. One needs to 
remember, however, there is a certain meta-
physical view standing behind his claim. Aris-
totle’s metaphysics is essentialist: he believes 
that every entity belongs to some natural cat-
egory, one determined by the entity’s essence 
(form); moreover, he believes that the essenc-
es may be captured by the so-called essential 
definitions[12]. Thus, the incorrect or metaphor-
ical use of words is not a mere mistake – it is 
an error that may effectively ruin our attempts 
to construct the foundations of knowledge, 
captured by the essential definitions. This 
doctrine is, of course, far from the actual sci-
entific practice. The history of science shows 
clearly that no such foundations should be as-
sumed as they are most likely to ban scientific 
progress. But if so, the same holds for Ben-
nett and Hacker’s view: if they indeed believe 
that the conceptual scheme of the ordinary 
language determines ‘the only’ ontology, their 
conception is hopelessly flawed.
It is also possible to read Bennett and Hacker 
in a more moderate manner; this weaker in-
terpretation is that they only underscore that 
the conceptual scheme which constitutes the 
framework for the ordinary language does not 
determine any unique ontology, but neverthe-
less is independent of any scientific practice, 
in the sense that in order to communicate any 
scientific discovery one needs to employ con-
cepts according to some pre-existing criteria. If 
one does not do so, one risks following wrong 
12Popper, K. (1966) The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. II, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, p. 1ff.
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paths and uttering nonsensical statements: the 
incorrect use of language can lead us astray. 
The conceptual scheme of the ordinary lan-
guage constitutes, at the very least, the foun-
dation for communicating scientific theories. 
This view – even on the moderate reading –is 
troublesome. Firstly and less importantly, Ben-
nett and Hacker are mistaken when they claim 
that an excessive use of metaphors, and in par-
ticular clusters of metaphors is destructive for 
any neuroscientific endeavour. Certainly, it may 
lead to blind alleys yet there is little danger that 
the consequences of such a way of expression 
will be daring. The reason is that neuroscience, 
as any other science, has some built-in correc-
tive mechanisms that ultimately help us to dis-
tinguish progress and fruitful hypotheses from 
mere mistakes and useless conjectures. The 
presence of this mechanism is evident once 
one considers the recent successes of neuro-
science. A science which overuses metaphors 
and leads to no serious predictions or explana-
tions is simply a bad science; the mere fact of 
committing or omitting the mereological fallacy 
is of no significance here.
Secondly, we should consider the bigger pic-
ture, which is encapsulated in Bennett and 
Hacker’s claim that the conceptual scheme of 
the ordinary language is a priori relative to the 
scientific practice. It is particularly troublesome 
with respect to neuroscience. It must be real-
ized that the psychological idiom, characteris-
tic of the ordinary language, is not only shaped 
by our inner experience but also by the theories 
developed throughout the history which aimed 
at conceptually capturing mental phenomena. 
The problem is that the conceptual scheme 
of the ordinary language is characterized by 
some inertia: it takes much time for the current 
scientific conceptions to ‘infiltrate’ our ordinary 
conceptual scheme. It is safe, therefore, to as-
sume that today’s ordinary language ‘embrac-
es’ some psychological theories of yesterday, 
or better even: a blend of those theories and 
common-sense ideas. Now, to say that ordi-
nary concepts are a priori relative to neurosci-
ence amounts to saying that folk psychology is 
a priori to neuroscientific theories, which is an 
outright nonsense: it is one of the main goals 
of the contemporary neuroscience, one that 
it fulfils vigorously and with much success, to 
revise our old, common-sense psychological 
notions.
This clearly shows that Bennett and Hacker’s 
conceptual foundationalism is faithful neither 
to the mechanisms of scientific practice, nor to 
the way our conceptual schemes evolve: they 
are never final, or independent of the theories 
we develop. This point is quite general and 
pertains to any foundational philosophical pro-
ject: the sources of philosophical reflection are 
always, at least partially, based on some scien-
tific conceptions, although often on outdated 
ones. In the case of Thomism, the Aristotelian 
view of the world – or the Aristotelian science 
– constitutes the foundations of the conceptual 
scheme. Similarly, in the case of those philoso-
phies that find confirmations or disconfirma-
tions in the workings of the ordinary language, 
it is the knowledge encapsulated there (e.g., a 
kind of folk psychology being a blend of the 
common sense observations and some old 
psychological theories) that ultimately deter-
mines the philosophical doctrines of the fol-
lowers of Austin and Strawson. In other foun-
dational projects, such as phenomenology, the 
scientific knowledge internalized by any given 
person crucially shapes their experiences, and 
so their philosophical views. All in all, there is no 
source of philosophical knowledge that would 
be independent of some kind of science, and 
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the key point is that this ‘hidden science’ may 
be at odds with what the contemporary sci-
ence has to say. The splendid isolation of ordi-
nary language philosophers is an illusion: there 
is no escape from the confrontation with the 
barbarians from the other side of the Channel.
It does not mean, of course, that the mutual 
interactions between neuroscience and ontol-
ogy are unproblematic and straightforward. It 
is difficult to imagine that some neuroscientific 
discovery or theory may have direct bearing on 
ontological deliberations. In this sense, Hacker 
and Bennett make a valid point: philosophy 
and neuroscience use different methods, dif-
ferent conceptual schemes, as well as deal 
with different kinds of problems. However, as 
I tried to stress, those different discourses are 
not isolated from one another; rather, they in-
teract in numerous ways. It is difficult to map 
those interactions precisely, and harder still to 
uncover their structure. They take place at vari-
ous levels: conceptual (concepts migrate from 
philosophy to neuroscience and vice versa, 
often altering their meaning), presuppositional 
(scientific theories and methods often presup-
pose strictly philosophical theses), problem 
(philosophy and science often tackle similar 
problems), and functional (e.g., scientific theo-
ries may in some contexts replace philosophi-
cal theories, while philosophical doctrines can 
play a heuristic role in science).[13] The scope 
of the present paper is too limited to provide a 
more comprehensive description of these in-
teractions.[14] The moral is, however, that since 
13I provide a more in-depth analysis of the four levels in Brożek, 
B. (2011) Philosophy in Neuroscience, in: Brożek, B., Mączka, J., 
Grygiel, W. (eds.), Philosophy in Science. Methods and Applica-
tions, Copernicus Copernicus Center Press, Kraków.  
14For further details see Brożek, B. Models of Naturalizing Juris 
prudence, in manuscript.
such interactions exist, it is possible to relate 
ontologies to neuroscientific theories. 
The ontologies one develops may be more or 
less coherent with given neuroscientific con-
ceptions. For example: if a neuroscientific 
theory presupposes some form of strong re-
ductionism (i.e. the thesis that all mental phe-
nomena may be fully explained by brain activ-
ity), then such a theory is more coherent with 
some version of materialism than it is with a 
dualistic ontology, which underscores strict 
separation of mind and body. The Aristotelian 
conception of the mind is more coherent with 
the embodied mind paradigm than it is with the 
view that mind is a kind of a Turing machine. 
These bold examples show that ontology and 
neuroscience are not completely alien to each 
other. If one embraced strict mind-body dual-
ism in their ontological conception, while be-
lieving in strict reductionism underlying their 
neuroscientific considerations, they would sim-
ply be incoherent in their beliefs. Our knowl-
edge does not consist of isolated ‘islands’ – 
that of ontology and that of neuroscience; it 
rather resembles Quine’s web of beliefs, where 
ontological and scientific conceptions are in-
terconnected in various ways.
When investigating the relationship between 
neuroscience and legal ontology one has at 
least two strategies at hand. The first may be 
deemed presupposition analysis. It consists in 
uncovering the relevant presuppositions of a 
given ontology and checking whether they are 
coherent with the neuroscientific theories. For 
example, the view of law proposed by Thomas 
Hobbes assumes a peculiar view of human na-
ture, according to which humans act in a purely 
egoistic way. This is incompatible with the find-
ings of the contemporary evolutionary theory 
and neuroscience. At the same time, John 
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Locke’s view of human nature, which serves 
as the basis of his conception of law, is much 
more coherent with the picture of human moti-
vational mechanisms as found in scientific lit-
erature. Thus, one may conclude that Locke’s 
theory of law is more coherent with the views 
embraced by the contemporary neuroscien-
tists than Hobbes’ conception is.[15]
The second strategy is genealogical. Here, one 
does not begin with an ontology, but by recon-
structing the evolutionary history of the devel-
opment of the relevant abilities of the human 
species. Let us consider law or any other social 
institution. A genealogical narrative does not 
lead to one particular ontology of law, but rath-
er uncovers the mechanisms which made the 
emergence of law possible in the first place. 
But this is an important insight, one that ex-
cludes certain social ontologies (as incoherent 
with the reconstructed evolutionary scenario), 
while allowing a number of other ontological 
stances (as coherent with the scenario to a 
greater or lesser degree). 
In what follows, I adopt the second strategy.
The emergence of culture
In order to inquire into the origins of law – or, to 
put in differently, to answer the question ‘what 
makes the law possible’ – one needs to bear in 
mind two methodological precepts. First, there 
is no point in limiting the analysis to the find-
ings of neuroscience alone. On the one hand, 
neuroscience is difficult to define in such a way 
that it would be clearly distinguished from re-
lated sciences (e.g., evolutionary theory, pri-
15Załuski, W. (2009). Evolutionary Theory and Legal Philosophy, 
Edward Elgar.
matology, developmental psychology, etc.). On 
the other hand, such a limitation would make 
our quest for a theory of the origins of law 
much weaker. The more arguments from differ-
ent disciplines can be formulated in support of 
a given evolutionary scenario, the better justi-
fied it is.[16] The second precept is the following: 
there is no sense in inquiring into the origins of 
law per se, as if it was completely separated 
from the other forms of cultural behaviour. It 
does not seem possible that the law evolved 
separately from morality or other social institu-
tions. The question ‘how is the law possible?’ 
is only a small aspect of a more general ques-
tion: ‘how is culture possible?’
The emergence of culture is a puzzle for one 
simple reason. Michael Tomasello notes:
The 6 million years that separates human be-
ings from other great apes is a very short time 
evolutionarily, with modern humans and chim-
panzees sharing something on the order of 99 
percent of their genetic material – the same 
degree of relatedness as that of other sister 
genera such as lions and tigers, horses and 
zebras, and rats and mice. Our problem is thus 
one of time. The fact is, there simply has not 
been enough time for normal processes of bio-
logical evolution involving genetic variation and 
natural selection to have created, one by one, 
each of the cognitive skills necessary for mod-
ern humans to invent and maintain complex 
tool-use industries and technologies, complex 
forms of symbolic communication and repre-
sentation, and complex social organizations 
and institutions.[17]
16Brożek, B. (2015). Explanation and Understanding, in: Brożek, 
B., Stelmach, J., Hohol M. (eds.), The Concept of Explanation, 
Kraków: Copernicus Center Press.
17Tomasello, M. (1999) Cultural Origins of Human Cognition, Har-
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And he adds:
There is only one possible solution to this puz-
zle. That is, there is only one known biological 
mechanism that could bring about these kinds 
of changes in behaviour and cognition in so 
short a time (…). This biological mechanism is 
social or cultural transmission, which works on 
time scales many orders of magnitude faster 
than those of organic evolution.[18]
Thus, Tomasello claims that the richness and 
complexity of human culture cannot be ex-
plained by the mechanism of biological evo-
lution alone; rather, one needs to posit that in 
our phylogenetic past some relatively minor 
biological adaptations paved the way for the 
emergence of the mechanism of cultural evo-
lution. The crucial aspect of this mechanism is 
what Tomasello calls the cultural ratchet: cul-
tural transmission is cumulative, i.e. the behav-
ioural patterns discovered by one generation 
are passed on to the subsequent generations. 
Because of that, there is no need to ‘reinvent 
the wheel again’ – we are born into a society 
that already possesses a substantive arsenal 
of the forms of conceptualizing experience, 
behavioural patterns and tools. 
The essential question reads: what are the 
biologically conditioned abilities of the human 
species that enabled cultural transmission? A 
well-grounded answer points towards the so-
cial learning mechanism of imitation. Robin 
Dunbar notes:
Human babies are imitation machines who 
seem to suck up anything and everything they 
vard University Press: Cambridge, Mass, p. 2. 
18Ibidem, p. 4.
come across that involves imitation of another 
individual’s behaviour. Teaching helps to guide 
that up-take, but without the human child’s 
seemingly infinite capacity for imitation, it is 
doubtful whether any amount of teaching by 
the parent would help in the absorption of so 
much behaviour in so short a space of time. 
In contrast, young chimpanzees seem more 
proactive and clued in to finding things out for 
themselves.[19]
It is common to distinguish several different 
mechanisms of social learning. Given the pur-
pose of this paper, the important distinction is 
between imitation and emulation. Imitation con-
sists in copying both the goal (the change in 
the environment) of someone else’s behaviour 
as well as the way of acting, while emulation 
is confined to trying to achieve the same goal. 
Primatologists agree that non-human primates 
emulate rather than imitate. For example, in an 
experiment conducted by Tomasello, Nagel and 
Olguin, two groups of chimpanzees and two 
groups of two-year-old children were shown 
two ways of using a rake-like tool to reach food, 
of which one was more efficient than the other. 
Each group saw one method only. It turned out 
that the chimpanzees from both groups did 
not mimic the instructors’ behaviour exactly, 
but used the rake in various ways. According 
to Tomasello, it can be interpreted as showing 
that chimpanzees learn by emulation: the way 
of using a tool is not important, whereas the 
change in the environment – reaching for the 
food – is. Meanwhile, children participating in 
the experiment repeated the actions of the in-
structor, even if they followed the less-efficient 
method of using the rake. Tomasello believes 
that this is evidence that humans – in contrast to 
great apes – do not learn through emulation but 
19Dunbar, R. (2004). Human Story, Faber and Faber, p. 159.
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through imitation. He adds that learning through 
emulation may under some circumstances 
prove more efficient than imitation; however, the 
latter has a significant social potential, as imi-
tating requires paying attention not only to the 
changes in the external environment, but also 
to the behaviour of others.[20]
The evolutionary advantages of imitation over 
emulation and other social learning strategies 
become clearly visible when one considers the 
following facts. First, imitation is the mechanism 
which leads to the accumulation of knowledge 
regarding behavioural patterns. Emulation or in-
dividual learning by trial and error do not guar-
antee the inter-generational transmission of the 
communally shared ways of acting. Second, imi-
tation is cost-minimizing when compared to indi-
vidual learning. Third, it is the only social learning 
mechanism which enables recombination, i.e. 
using the same means to achieve different goals 
or attaining the same goal with different means. 
In other words, imitation leads to some kind of 
‘combinatorial explosion’, enhancing considera-
bly the set of behavioural tools an individual pos-
sesses. Fourth, imitation enables easy modifica-
tions: due to the fact that it requires us to learn 
the mode of acting, it opens the way for intro-
ducing modifications to the existing behavioural 
patterns. Fifth, imitation is fine-grained, i.e. it is 
the only mechanism that enables the existence 
of very similar, yet distinct, patterns of conduct. 
Let us consider the language: we often use very 
similar utterances, but to achieve completely dif-
ferent goals. If emulation constituted the learn-
ing strategy responsible for communication, lan-
guage would be impossible.[21]
20Tomasello, M. (1999) Cultural Origins of Human Cognition, Har-
vard University Press: Cambridge, Mass. 
21Brożek, B. Imitation and the Emergence of Normative Orders, 
in: Brożek, B., Stelmach, J., Kurek, Ł., (eds.), The Emergence  of 
What are the biological adaptations that en-
able imitation? It is customary to talk about 
the human ability to imitate and tendency to 
imitate: the former is a cognitive while the lat-
ter a motivational mechanism. The cognitive 
aspect of imitation is crucially linked with the 
ability of mindreading, i.e. ascribing beliefs 
and intentions to others (this mechanism is 
often called ‘theory of mind’). In order to dis-
tinguish between the way of acting and the ac-
tion’s goal one needs to understand what the 
other individual is trying to do. There are two 
main accounts of how mindreading works: the 
theory theory and the simulation theory. Ac-
cording to the former, the ascription of mental 
states or intentions to others proceeds through 
a kind of reasoning from the first-person rela-
tions to the third-person relations: it is based 
on such schemata as ‘I behave in the way x 
when I feel pain; therefore, if he behaves in the 
way x, it means he feels pain’.[22] The simula-
tion theory, on the other hand, suggests a dif-
ferent mechanism at work. For example, Alvin 
Goldman claims that the ascription of mental 
states to others proceeds as follows. In stage 
one, through the ‘mindreading’ of another per-
son’s mental state, the brain generates a state 
similar to the state of the mind of the other per-
son. The second stage consists in processing 
the obtained data, with the use of one’s own 
neural system, but working ‘off-line’. Goldman 
believes that the brain uses the same circuits 
when we experience something and when we 
‘read’ the similar experiences of others. The 
results of the ‘off-line’ simulation are in the last 
stage ascribed to the observed person. Thus, 
Normative Orders, Kraków: Copernicus Center Press.
22Meltzoff, A. N. (2005) Imitation and Other Minds: The <Like 
Me> Hypothesis, in: Hurley, S., Chater, N. (eds.), Perspectives on 
Imitation, vol. 2: Imitation, Human Development, and Culture, MIT 
Press: Cambridge, Mass, p. 55–77.
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according to the simulation theory, mindread-
ing does not require carrying out of any reason-
ing.[23] Interestingly, in the first stage of Gold-
man’s model some form of very basic imitation 
(generating a mind state similar to the state 
of the mind of the other person) occurs. This 
leads to the question, what is phylogenetically 
and ontogenetically prior – mindreading or imi-
tation. Susan Hurley and Nick Chater suggest 
that the question may be ill-stated: mindread-
ing and imitation are two abilities which de-
velop simultaneously – imitation requires fully 
developed mindreading capabilities, and vice 
versa. But both skills are built upon some rudi-
mentary abilities: Very early imitation may ex-
press a fundamental self–other similarity, while 
the distinctive human capacity for imitative 
learning with its flexible means-ends structure 
in turn contributes to the development of the 
self–other distinction and of more advanced 
mind-reading skills.[24]
The single most important discovery that 
brings us closer to understanding of how imi-
tation and mindreading are possible is argu-
ably the discovery of the mirror neurons by 
neuroscientists from Parma in the early 1990s.
[25] Mirror neurons fire both when an action is 
executed and when it is observed.[26] Hence, 
they provide some support for the simulation 
theory: there exists a neural mechanism which 
23Ibidem.
24Hurley, S., Chater N. Introduction: The Importance of Imitation, 
in: Hurley, S., Chater, N. (eds.), Perspectives on Imitation, vol. 2, 
op. cit., p. 33.
25Di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., Rizolatti, G. 
(1992) Understanding Motor Events: A Neuropsychological Study, 
Experimental Brain Research, 91, 1, p. 176–180.
26There are, however, some reservations as to the real signifi-
cance of the mirror system; see Hickok, G. (2014) The Myth of 
Mirror Neurons, W.W. Norton & Company, New York.
engages the same brain circuits when an ac-
tion is performed and when it is only observed. 
In this way, no first-person to third-person rea-
soning is needed to grasp someone else’s ac-
tion, as his or her action is automatically ‘simu-
lated’ by the brain of the observer. Similarly, the 
existence mirror system may contribute to the 
explanation of the mechanism of imitation. For 
example, Giacomo Rizolatti claims that there 
are two types of mirror neuron resonance and, 
as a result, two types of imitation. The high 
level resonance is used to mirror the goal of 
an action, while the low-level resonance cop-
ies the way of acting. According to Rizolatti, 
only the human brain takes advantage of both 
mechanisms, which enables imitation. In apes 
and (possibly) other animals only high-level 
resonance is used and this explains apes’ abil-
ity to learn solely by emulation.[27]
Let us turn now to the human tendency to imi-
tate. It is often stressed that while non-human 
primates display some cognitive capacity for 
imitation, they imitate quite rarely due to the 
lack of relevant emotional and motivational 
mechanisms. Michael Tomasello notes: there 
was some initial step in human evolution away 
from great apes, involving the emotional and 
motivational side of experience, that propelled 
humans into a new adaptive space in which 
complex skills and motivations for collabora-
tive activities and shared intentionality could 
be selected.[28]
Tomasello claims further that the human will-
27Rizolatti, G. (2005) The Mirror Neuron System and Imita-
tion, in: Hurley, S., Chater, N. (eds.), Perspectives on Imitation, 
vol. 1: Mechanisms of Imitation and Imitation in Animals, MIT 
Press: Cambridge, Mass, p. 55–76.
28Tomasello, M. (2009) Why We Cooperate, MIT Press: Cam-
bridge, Mass, p. 85.
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ingness to cooperate and mimic others is only 
a manifestation of a more basic biological ad-
aptation: mutualism[29]. He observes that coop-
eration among apes is usually based on kin-
ship or reciprocity. The evolutionary passage 
from these two forms of behaviour to the hu-
man cooperative capacities was conditioned 
by three processes: the development of social 
cognition and motivational mechanisms, ena-
bling the coordination of cooperative activities 
and complex communication; the increase of 
tolerance and trust in relation to others, pri-
marily in the context of acquiring food; and the 
development of group institutional practices 
based on social norms[30].
At the neuroscientific end of the story, it is 
speculated that the emotional and motivational 
mechanisms required to generate human col-
laborative behaviour are also conditioned by 
the existence of the mirror system. For instance, 
Marco Iacoboni observes – on the basis of an-
atomical facts and neuroimaging data – that a 
part of the insula, the disgranural field, is con-
nected with both the limbic system, as well as 
the posterior parietal, inferior frontal, and superi-
or temporal cortex. This leads to the hypothesis 
that it is the insula that provides the limbic areas, 
responsible for emotional response, with the in-
formation on the observed and executed action. 
The hypothesis is further supported by experi-
mental findings which indicate that the process 
of imitating an ‘emotional’ facial expression in-
creases the activity of the amygdala, i.e. of the 
part of the limbic system which plays a crucial 
role in emotional processes.[31] These and other 
29Ibidem.
30J. Silk claims that altruism is prior to mutualism; see her com-
mentary in ibidem, p. 111–124.
31Iacoboni, M. Understanding Others: Imitation, Language and 
observations led Iacoboni to the conclusion that 
the mirror neuron system – and imitation – are 
necessary for experiencing empathy:
we understand the feelings of others via a 
mechanism of action representation that 
shapes emotional content, such that our em-
pathic resonance is grounded in the experi-
ence of our acting body and the emotions 
associated with specific movements. (...) In or-
der to empathize, we rely on mediation by the 
representation of the actions associated with 
the emotions we are witnessing and on a brain 
network that includes structures supporting 
communication between action representation 
circuits and circuits dedicated to emotional 
processing.[32]
A similar standpoint is adopted by Vittorio Gal-
lese, who remarks:
The discovery of mirror neurons in adult individ-
uals shows that the very same neural substrate 
is activated when some of these expressive 
acts are both executed and perceived. Thus, 
we have a subpersonally instantiated common 
space. It relies on the neural circuits involved in 
the control of actions. The hypothesis I am put-
ting forward here is that a similar mechanism 
could underpin our capacity to share feelings 
and emotions with others. My proposal is that 
sensations and emotions displayed by others 
can also be empathized with, and therefore im-
plicitly understood, through a mirror matching 
mechanism.[33]
Empathy, in: Hurley, S., Chater, N. (eds.), Perspectives on Imita-
tion, vol. 1, op. cit. 
32Ibidem, p. 98.
33Gallese, V. Being like me: Self – Other Identity, Mirror Neurons, 
and Empathy, in: Hurley, S., Chater, N. (eds.), Perspectives on 
Polish Law Review  www.polishlawreview.pl
ORIGINAL ARTICLENeuroscience and the Ontology of Law
121
Human ability to imitate, together with our ten-
dency to be like others and mimic them, condi-
tioned the emergence of behavioural patterns 
shared within human communities and passed 
on from generation to generation. Already at 
this stage of the human phylogenesis one can 
speak of the development of some rudimenta-
ry forms of the rule-following practices.[34] The 
spontaneously emerging patterns of behaviour, 
propagated through the mechanism of imita-
tion and shared by a community, had some de-
gree of objectivity. Moreover, they were collec-
tively enforced: the violators were punished or 
corrected by other members of the community. 
Importantly, this cognitive and motivational 
framework also constituted a platform for the 
emergence of language. Tomasello notes:
Human cooperative communication (…) 
evolved first within the bounds of collaborative 
activities because these activities provided the 
needed common ground for establishing joint 
topics, and because they generated the coop-
erative motives.[35]
There is a number of evolutionary scenarios 
which stress that the sources of linguistic abili-
ties lie in the human tendency to cooperate, 
and are ultimately based on the neural struc-
ture provided by the mirror neurons. For exam-
ple, Merlin Donald identifies four main types of 
mimetic representation, which are key to the 
transmission and propagation of culture: (1) 
reenactive mime, characteristic of role-playing; 
(2) precise means-end imitation (as in learning 
how to fry an egg); (3) the systematic rehearsal 
Imitation, vol. 1, op.cit., p. 133.
34Brożek, B. (2013) Rule-following. From Imitation to the Norma-
tive Mind, Kraków: Copernicus Center Press, chapter 2.
35Tomasello, M. Why We Cooperate, op. cit., p. 73.
and refinement of skill (as in learning how to 
drive a car); and (4) nonlinguistic gesture (as 
in learning how to dance).[36] He further claims 
that these mimetic skills were the foundation 
for the emergence of language and all the 
other forms of culture. He stresses that his 
proposal differs from the traditional scenarios 
which condition the emergence of culture on 
the prior emergence of language (the language 
first theory). According to Donald, some forms 
of culture, based on mimetic skills, must have 
preceded language and enabled its evolution 
(the culture first theory)[37]. 
Donald’s theory leads to profound consequenc-
es. Firstly, he claims that the human mind is 
intimately linked to the society in which it flour-
ishes. One can even say that it is co-created by 
the community. Communal practices are con-
stitutive of the human mind, both in their phylo-
genetic and ontogenetic dimensions. Secondly, 
language is not an individual but a network-level 
phenomenon: its evolution resembles the evolu-
tion of an ecosystem rather than of a single or-
ganism. Thirdly, it follows that ‘cognitive neuro-
scientists are unlikely to find an innate language 
acquisition device, and should redirect their 
investigations toward the powerful analogue 
processing systems out of which language can 
emerge in group interactions.’[38]
The emergence of language further consolidat-
ed human rule-following practices. With time, it 
also enabled the linguistic formulation of rules 
of conduct, and opened the way for critically 
discussing them. In this way, humanity reached 
36Donald, M. Imitation and Mimesis, In: Hurley, S., Chater, N. 
(eds.), Perspectives on Imitation vol. 2, op.cit., p. 283–300. 
37Ibidem.
38 Ibidem, p. 294.
Pol Law Rev, 2017 Vol. 3 (1), p. 110-125
ORIGINAL ARTICLE 
DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0010.7842
Neuroscience and the Ontology of Law
122
the stage when the development of full-blooded 
moral and legal systems became possible. 
The illusive nature of law
In order to relate the above sketched picture of 
the emergence of culture to the problems of le-
gal ontology, let us introduce a heuristic distinc-
tion between rudimentary and abstract rules. By 
qualifying the distinction as ‘heuristic’ I want to 
emphasize that it may represent only a simpli-
fied view of the rule-following practices. At the 
same time, I believe that it is compatible with 
the evolutionary scenario outlined above, as 
well as highly instructive: even if a fully accept-
able ontology of rules would require much more 
complex conceptual distinctions, the categories 
of rudimentary and abstract rules capture some 
crucial aspects of any such well-developed on-
tology.[39]
Rudimentary rules can be characterized as: 
(a) independent of language (a fully devel-
oped language, i.e. a system consisting of 
well-defined vocabulary and grammar rules is 
evolutionarily and logically dependent on the 
existence of rudimentary rules); (b) simple and 
concrete (rudimentary rules pertain to relatively 
simple and concrete forms of behaviour); (c) 
normatively unified (rudimentary rules cannot 
be divided into kinds – at the rudimentary level 
there are no mathematical, linguistic, moral or 
legal rules); (d) multi-aspect and non-modal 
(rudimentary rules pertain to some form of be-
haviour as a whole, they say what should be 
done under given circumstances and involve 
no deontic operators such as ‘obligatory’, ‘for-
bidden’ or ‘permitted’).  
39The distinction is fully developed and defended in Brożek, B. 
Rule-following…, op. cit., chapter 2.
Abstract rules, on the other hand, depend 
on the existence of rudimentary rules. With-
out the rudimentary form of rule-following it 
would be difficult to imagine how abstract 
rules emerged: they would be a kind of mira-
cle. If not for the rudimentary rules, our nor-
mative systems such as language, morality or 
law would become an evolutionary enigma, 
and achievement such unique and qualita-
tively different from the ‘culture’ of other pri-
mates that any attempt at explaining them 
would be destined to fail. Abstract rules were 
developed through linguistic formulation and 
reflection over the rudimentary forms of rule-
following. In contrast to rudimentary rules, 
they: (a) depend on language (must be formu-
lated in language); (b) may be complex (i.e., 
may refer to complex behavioural patterns) 
and general (i.e. they may refer to generally 
defined, non-concrete actions); (c) norma-
tively differentiated (i.e., they may be divided 
into kinds: linguistic, moral, legal); and (d) as-
pectualized and modalized (i.e., they may per-
tain to some aspects of actions only, and be 
expressed with the use of deontic operators).
Abstract rules are therefore the results of theo-
rizing some aspects of rudimentary rules. To 
illustrate this point, let us consider language. 
What one finds in dictionaries and grammar 
textbooks is a picture of language as an iso-
lated system of syntactic and semantic rules; 
but this is already an outcome of developing a 
theoretical account of language. To borrow a 
phrase from American legal realists: language 
in books is a well-behaved system of rules, 
while language in action is constituted by the 
multiplicity of behavioural patterns in which 
linguistic, moral, mathematical and other as-
pects are intimately linked together. When one 
describes someone as guilty, one may be said 
to follow a rudimentary rule (one does what 
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is done under similar circumstances in his or 
her community), but from the more theoreti-
cal perspective in may be seen simultaneously 
as observing a linguistic, a moral, a prudential 
or a legal rule. Crucially, the same amalgam 
of rudimentary rules may give rise to different 
theoretical reconstructions at the level of ab-
stract rules, and hence one can have differing 
accounts of language, prudence or morality.
Still, abstract rules – i.e., normative systems 
we formulate in language, discuss, criticize 
and change – do influence our behaviour. 
The influence is either direct, when one con-
sciously applies an abstract rule, or (more of-
ten) indirect, when the behavioural patterns 
prescribed by some abstract rules become 
‘fibres’ in the amalgam of rudimentary rules. 
In other words, abstract rules may inform ru-
dimentary rule-following practices. This feed-
back loop – abstract rules’ dependence on the 
existence of rudimentary rules, and the influ-
ence the latter have on the rudimentary rule-
following practice – underscores the heuristic 
character of the distinction between rudimen-
tary and abstract rules: it is a useful analytic 
tool that captures some important aspects of 
rule-following, but does not provide us with a 
fully adequate picture of the complexity of the 
phenomenon in question. 
These remarks have direct relevance for the 
problem of the nature of law. The nature of law 
– or the correct definition of law – has long been 
the holy grail of legal philosophers. It is symp-
tomatic, however, that the repeated attempts 
to develop a commonly accepted theory of law 
have failed. Already at the beginning of the 20th 
century Leon Petrażycki wrote:
The fact that until today it has proved impos-
sible to define the law, even if much effort was 
devoted to the task and – with the passage of 
time – innumerable, more or less ingenious and 
fundamental attempts to characterize the es-
sence of law were proposed, has recently led 
to doubts of whether the task may be compet-
ed at all, and to accepting definitions which are 
clearly lacking, as well as steering clear of the 
question pertaining to the essence of law, in 
order to achieve some peace.[40]
Fifty years later H.L.A. Hart made an almost 
identical observation:
Few questions concerning human society have 
been asked with such persistence and an-
swered by serious thinkers in so many diverse, 
strange, and even paradoxical ways as the 
question ‘What is law?’ Even if we confine our 
attention to the legal theory of the last 50 years 
and neglect classical and medieval specula-
tion about the ‘nature’ of law, we shall find a 
situation not paralleled in any other subject 
systematically studied as a separate academic 
discipline.[41]
Petrażycki’s and Hart’s observations can be 
easily repeated even today. This surprising 
fact leads to the conclusion that there may 
be ‘something wrong’ with the very project of 
providing a characterization of the essence of 
law or with searching for the nature of law. The 
recurring failures of the project suggest that it 
may be based on some false assumptions.
I believe that the analyses of the preceding 
sections of this paper shed some light on this 
problem. Any conception of law is some theo-
40Petrażycki, L. (1959) Wstęp do nauki o prawie i moralności, 
Warszawa: PWN, p. 25
41Hart, H. L. A. The Concept of Law, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 1.
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retical account of the chosen aspects of rudi-
mentary rules. In other words, any conception 
of law is a reconstruction of the actual social 
practices, and the practices themselves do not 
fall into any pre-theoretical, natural categories. 
Rudimentary rules are not legal, moral or pru-
dential: they are just patterns of conduct which 
are observed in the given community. Only 
after theorizing some of their aspects, one 
can construct a legal or a moral system. This 
picture is further complicated by the fact that 
our theoretical endeavours, i.e. the normative 
systems we develop as well as the accounts 
of law or morality we construct, entertain some 
influence on the rudimentary rule-following 
practices. For a learned medieval person, law 
was something different than it was for an early 
20th century positivist, not only because they 
embraced different conceptions of law, but 
also due to the fact that those conceptions 
(natural law theory on the one hand, and le-
gal positivism on the other) to a large extent 
informed the relevant social practices.
Thus, if the evolutionary scenario of the emer-
gence of culture I sketched above is even 
roughly correct, one should not expect to cap-
ture the ‘real nature of law’. This conclusion is 
true irrespective of whether one understand 
‘the nature of law’ as referring to something 
‘out there’, i.e. some element of the structure 
of reality (as in the case of substantive natu-
ral law theories), or as pertaining to necessary 
and/or sufficient conditions of applying the 
predicate ‘law’ (as in the case of some con-
temporary positivistic theories of law). There 
is no nature of law in the substantive under-
standing of the word, since the law is a result 
of our joint practical and theoretical efforts. 
For the same reason, there is no nature of law 
understood as consisting in some criteria for 
distinguishing law from other phenomena. Of 
course, such criteria may be proposed, but 
one should not expect to find them fixed once 
and for all or without a tenable alternative. In a 
way, in theoretical reconstructions of law one 
can never adopt a purely external point of view: 
by developing a theory of law one eo ipso par-
ticipates in legal discourse and influences the 
forms of the relevant social practices, even if 
the influence is very limited. It does not mean, 
of course, that our theoretical quests for the 
nature of law are completely futile: at the very 
least, they inform our understanding of, and 
help to improve, the legal practice. But it does 
not change the fact that there is no ‘one true 
picture of the law’, just like there is no one true 
picture of morality or language.
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